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Blogs about current (mostly European) macroeconomic developments through the prism of someone in between academia and journalism.
Monday, May 8, 2023
Sunday, May 7, 2023
Short argument for optimistic scenario for core euro zone inflation
The optimistic case rests one two arguments. First, some
segments of core inflation should benefit from reversal of the shocks that
drove prices higher last year. For non-energy industrial goods this is about
lower energy prices feeding through to lower industrial good prices, and about
unwinding supply bottlenecks leading to lower equilibrium prices. For services
this is about price increases related to re-opening going into reverse.
While all of this is possible – I would even venture to say
that the question is of magnitudes, not whether it will happen - on its own it
is unlikely to inspire that much optimism. Especially, when the counterargument
is that wages are increasing pretty rapidly by historical standards. And here
in comes the second argument: While nominal wages are increasing
at fast pace and will continue to do so, what matters for inflation outlook is
the level of real wages. And the key point is that even with
rapid increase in nominal wages, real wages will only come back to pre-pandemic
level in 2025, as per ECB:
And in this lies the optimistic case for euro zone core
inflation. It is really the counterargument for pessimist case, which is built
around wages. In other words, at the heart of the optimistic case is that the
argument based on wages carries much less weight than people think. Sure,
ceteris paribus wages increasing rapidly implies higher inflation, but that
on its own does not imply high inflation. The reason is that so far
prices have increased without corresponding increase in wages, so that now wages
have scope to increase without a need for prices to increase. So the optimistic
case for core euro zone inflation is built around the simple argument that previous
price increases that outpaced wage increases created a cushion in which effect
of wage increase can be absorbed.
The other way to think about this is in terms of profits:
after profits rose significantly over last 3 years, there is a large scope for
firms to absorb higher wages without the need to increase prices. Again,
chart on profits from the ECB:
Add to this that the lower input prices (energy and food)
provide additional scope to absorb higher nominal wages even without lower
profit margins - decrease in one input cost would offset increase in
another input cost – and you end up with plausible optimistic case for
euro zone inflation.
Ultimately, given that we will be gradually returning to
pre-pandemic world in terms of external costs (energy, food, commodities and
transportation), in terms of supply in our economy (cars, airlines) and in
terms of demand (holidays), return of real wages to pre-pandemic world should
not mean high inflation. It is just return to an old equilibrium.